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Abstract
Distribution middleware is often integrated as a COTS, providing distribution facilities for critical,
embedded or large-scale applications. So far, typical middleware does not come with a complete
analysis of their behavioral properties. In this paper, we present our work on middleware modeling
and the veriﬁcation of its behavioral properties; the study is applied to our middleware architecture:
PolyORB. Then we present the tools and techniques deployed to actually verify the behavioral
properties of our model: Petri nets, temporal logic and advanced algorithms to reduce the size of
the state space. Finally, we detail some properties we verify and assess our methodology.
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1 Introduction: Issues in Middleware Engineering
Distribution middleware is now widely integrated as Components Oﬀ-The-
Shelf (COTS) in Distributed Real-Time Embedded (DRE) systems. The
properties of each building block must be known to ensure its correct inte-
gration to such system [4] and to ensure the correctness of the system as a
whole.
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In this context, the European Spatial Agency (ESA) identiﬁed several use
cases for middleware. They include ground stations interacting with satel-
lites as well as ﬂeets of collaborating satellites and drones. These applications
require multiple distribution mechanisms to handle variations in communica-
tion channels, ﬂexible resource management, and ensure autonomy for long
missions.
In addition to distribution needs, these systems come with non-functional
requirements, inherited from real-time engineering such as reliability, avail-
ability, dependability. Hence, properties (like determinism, safety, liveness,
timeliness) must be veriﬁed during the design process and in particular at the
middleware level.
Middleware solutions now support the requirements of most distributed
applications. They usually supports one given distribution model: a combina-
tion of one or several mechanisms to enable distribution, e.g. Message Passing
(MP), Remote Procedure Call (RPC), Distributed Object Computing (DOC)
or Shared Memory (SM). Yet, they usually do not address the veriﬁcation
of key behavioral properties such as request fairness, absence of deadlock or
correct resource dimensioning.
This calls for a next-generation of middleware that addresses these many
challenges [20]. Middleware architecture should be versatile to meet appli-
cation needs. Moreover it should follow an extensive proof-based system en-
gineering approach to provide strong evidence it is correct with respect to
application requirements.
This paper details a joint work on middleware veriﬁcation lead by the CS
department of the ENST (middleware experts) and SRC/LIP6 (veriﬁcation
experts).
We ﬁrst review well-known existing middleware architectures, and show
they do not facilitate veriﬁcation; then, we introduce the schizophrenic mid-
dleware architecture as a solution to achieve veriﬁcation. To verify key behav-
ioral properties in our middleware, we reﬁne our middleware components, we
model them using Petri nets and we assemble models to build one middleware
conﬁguration. As the system may be very complex, we present the algorithms
we used to address state space explosion and apply them to check middleware
behavioral properties. This provides a ﬁrst step towards building proof-based
middleware.
2 Problem statement
In this paper, we focus on the complete characterization of distribution mid-
dleware. In this section, we present some background on middleware archi-
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tectures. We then discuss the use of formal methods to verify behavioral
properties of middleware.
Formal modeling and middleware engineering are usually considered as
two diﬀerent expert domains. For instance, they are considered either by
separate teams of the project or at separate steps in the design process. To
eﬃciently reach our objective, we propose to reconcile system modeling and
middleware engineering, and join ENST and LIP6 eﬀorts. The ENST has a
long experience in middleware implementations, including GLADE, the only
industrial implementations of the Distributed System Annex of Ada 95; Ada-
Broker an Open Source CORBA ORB. The LIP6/SRC department has a
long experience in the development of algorithms and tools to apply formal
methods to distributed systems, it has developed the CPN-AMI tool-suite to
model and then analyse systems using Petri nets.
2.1 Middleware for DRE systems
DRE systems require adaptable distribution models and middleware archi-
tectures: Rajkumar [19] advertised Message Passing as a solution for DRE
systems, and proposed the Real-Time Publisher/Subscriber service. The Ada
Distributed Systems Annex [13,17] integrates several mechanisms (DOC, RPC,
SM). RT-CORBA extends CORBA’s DOC mechanisms for real-time systems
and integrates support for many QoS policies [21]. This leads to several tai-
lorable middleware architectures.
For instance, conﬁgurable middleware, such as TAO [22], let applications
select speciﬁc run-time policies to support the DOC distribution model. It
relies on architectural and design patterns [9] to support a large number of
policies.
Adaptive and reﬂective middleware [20,3] extends middleware conﬁgura-
bility mechanisms to enable adaptability to speciﬁc changes in application
context. This architecture provides promising properties to meet QoS appli-
cations requirements.
Generic middleware, such as Jonathan [26], deﬁnes abstract canonical com-
ponents and architecture, their instantiation provides a speciﬁc distribution
model. Jonathan provides a CORBA personality (David), a Java RMI per-
sonality (Jeremie) and specialized personalities for multimedia systems.
These architectures can meet stringent requirements. But they only par-
tially determine their properties: they usually rely on the testing of speciﬁc
scenarios such as Boeing’s Bold Stroke OFP [23]. However, there is a double
combinatorial explosion when considering middleware as a whole: the number
of possible execution scenarios for one middleware conﬁguration increases with
the interleaving of threads and requests; the number of possible conﬁgurations
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increases with middleware adaptability and versatility.
Thus, we claim testing is not suﬃcient to assess middleware behavioral
properties such as absence of deadlocks, request fairness, or correct resource
dimensioning. We propose to use formal methods to model and then verify
our system.
2.2 Formal methods for middleware veriﬁcation
This sections discusses the choice of a modeling language and its formal veri-
ﬁcation methods that are appropriate to model and then verify middleware.
There are currently two families of formal methods: proof-based veriﬁca-
tion (such as B [1] or Z [8]) and model checking (using tools and languages
such as SPIN [11] or LUSTRE [10]). In proof-based methods, the model is
described by means of axioms, properties are theorems to be veriﬁed using a
theorem prover. In model checking, the model is expressed using a language
from which an exhaustive execution can be computed (this usually requires
a mathematically based deﬁnition). An “execution engine” produces the ex-
haustive state space associated to the system as a graph where actions (atomic
instructions in the language) relate to states (a given possible value of the sys-
tem’s context). It is then possible to explore the graph to check if a property
is satisﬁed.
These two approaches are complementary. Proof-based techniques allow
the analysis of inﬁnite systems. However, the use of a theorem prover is a
very diﬃcult and a very technical task that is hard to automate. On the
contrary, model checking is dedicated to ﬁnite-state systems but modeling
and veriﬁcation can be done using graphical toolkits and most steps can be
automated [6].
We selected Well-formed Petri nets (WN) [5] as an input language for
model checking. WN are high-level Petri nets, in which tokens are typed
data holders. This allows for a concise and parametric deﬁnition of a system,
while preserving its semantics. One main feature of WN is that they allow
the automatic and eﬃcient construction of the symbolic reachability graph:
a quotient state-space, in which nodes are equivalence classes of states, and
arcs equivalence classes of events. This graph is built by exploiting symme-
try, yielding a symbolic state-space sometimes exponentially smaller than the
concrete state-space, and thus more manageable.
Recent works have automated the analysis of the symmetries allowed by a
system [25], and of the symmetries allowed by a property [2], allowing full LTL
model-checking while eﬃciently ﬁghting the well-known combinatorial state-
space explosion problem. As we show in sections 5.2 and 6.1, the use of these
symmetry-based reductions allows us to verify the properties of our system,
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while plain state-space generation is unfeasible with classic techniques.
In the remainder of the paper, we present the Schizophrenic Middleware
architecture, and show how we reengineer it to enable the veriﬁcation of mid-
dleware. Then, we detail the algorithms we used and analyze our middleware
architecture.
3 The Schizophrenic Middleware Architecture
In this section, we introduce the key elements of the “schizophrenic middleware
architecture”; and present its role in the veriﬁcation of behavioral properties.
Middleware combines two complementary facets: (1) a framework to im-
plement distributed systems, using the host and operating system resources
(e.g. tasks, I/O); and (2) a set of services to build portable distributed appli-
cations. In [12], we introduced the “schizophrenic middleware” architecture: a
unique architecture that advertises these two aspects, and enforces separation
of concerns.
In [28], we present PolyORB, our implementation of such a schizophrenic
middleware. We assess its suitability as a middleware platform to support
multiple speciﬁcations (CORBA, Ada Distributed Systems Annex, Web Ap-
plications, Ada Messaging Service close to Sun’s JMS) and as a COTS for
industry projects 3 .
From our experiments, we note that a reduced set of services is suﬃcient
to describe various distribution models. We identify seven steps in request
processing, each of which is deﬁned as one fundamental service. Services are
generic components for which an general implementation is provided. Devel-
opers may provide an alternate implementation. Each middleware instance is
one coherent assembling of these entities. The µBroker component coordinates
these diﬀerent services, it is responsible for the correct request propagation in
the middleware instance.
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Fig. 1. Request propagation in the Schizophrenic Middleware architecture
3 PolyORB is supported by AdaCore (http://libre.act-europe.fr/polyorb)
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Figure 1 illustrates how PolyORB services cooperate to transmit one re-
quest between two application entities, located on two separate nodes.
The client looks up server’s reference using the addressing service (1), a
dictionary-like component. Then, it uses the binding factory (2) to establish
a connection with the server, using one communication channels (e.g. sockets,
protocol stack).
Request parameters are mapped onto a representation suitable for trans-
mission over network, using the representation service (3), this is a mathe-
matical mapping that convert a data into a byte stream (e.g. CORBA CDR).
A protocol (4) is implemented for transmissions between the client and the
server nodes, through the transport (5) service, which establishes a commu-
nication channel between the two nodes. Both can be reduced to automata.
Then the request is sent through the network and unmarshalled by the server.
Upon the reception of a request, the middleware instance ensures that a
concrete entity is available to execute the request, using the activation ser-
vice (6). Finally, the execution service (7) assigns execution resources to pro-
cess the request. These two services rely on the factory and resource manage-
ment design patterns.
Hence, services in our middleware architecture are pipes and ﬁlters : they
compute a value and pass it to another component. Our experiments with
PolyORB showed they follow the same semantics, they are only adapted to
match precise speciﬁcations. They can be reduced to well-known abstractions.
The µBroker handles the coordination of these services: it allocates re-
sources and ensures the propagation of data through middleware. Besides,
it is the only component that controls the whole middleware: it manipulates
critical resources such as tasks and I/Os or global locks. It holds middleware
behavioral properties.
The Schizophrenic Middleware architecture provides a comprehensive de-
scription of middleware. This architecture separates a set of generic services
dedicated to request processing from the µBroker. The latter is directly re-
sponsible for middleware behavior. Thus, we isolate the control loop of our
system, present in all middleware instances: it is the key component to be
veriﬁed ﬁrst.
4 µBroker: source code and formal model implementa-
tions
We identiﬁed the µBroker as the control loop of our architecture. We now
discuss its architecture and mapping to both source code and formal imple-
mentations.
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4.1 µBroker architecture
We ﬁrst propose an architecture for the µBroker, and detail its components.
Several “strategies” have been deﬁned to create and use middleware re-
sources: [18] detail diﬀerent request processing policies implemented in TAO;
the CARISM project [14] allows for the dynamic reconﬁguration of commu-
nication stacks. Hence, the µBroker must be adaptable enough to support
most of them, and still provides a clear design to enable modeling and then
veriﬁcation.
We propose the following architecture for the µBroker(ﬁgure 2):
• the µBroker Core API handles the functional parts of the interactions with
other middleware services; it provides an interface to conﬁgure the middle-
ware instance and helper routines to execute speciﬁc functions such as man-
aging I/O. This component interacts directly with middleware the Binding,
Transport, Execution and Addressing services;
• the µBroker Controller manages the state automaton associated to the
µBroker. It grants access to middleware internals (tasks, I/O and queues)
and schedules tasks to process requests. It is responsible for the behavioral
part of the µBroker. Several policies reﬁnes its behavior: the Asynchronous
Event Checking policy sets up the polling and read strategies to check events
on I/O sources; the Request Scheduler sorts request to be processed (e.g.
FIFO, EDF orders), the Dispatcher selects threads that execute requests.
µBroker
Controller
µBroker policiesMiddleware services
µBroker
Core API
Functionnal
Behavioral
Binding
Transport
Execution
Addressing
Asynchronous
  Event Checking
Request Scheduler
Request Dispatcher
Task management
components
components
Fig. 2. The two sides of the µBroker
µBroker entities are deﬁned by their interface and a common high-level
behavioral contract, instances of these entities may reﬁne this behavior to sup-
port diﬀerent policies. This architecture has been implemented in PolyORB.
It uses well-deﬁned entities, and demonstrates its adaptability to support clas-
sical policies found in conﬁgurable middleware or deﬁned in speciﬁcations such
as RT-CORBA.
The µBroker pattern proposes a comprehensive description of the middle-
ware control loop, and a step towards veriﬁcation of middleware behavioral
properties.
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4.2 Modeling one middleware conﬁguration
Communication
places
Initial Marking
for scenario
1. Models library
2. Assembling a configuration 3. Evalutating one configuration
Fig. 3. Steps of the µBroker modeling
We now describe the modeling of our architecture using Petri nets as a
language for system modeling and veriﬁcation (ﬁgure 3).
Step 1: we elaborate one Petri net module for each middleware components
variation. Petri net transitions represent atomic actions; Petri net places
are either middleware states or resources. Common places between diﬀerent
modules deﬁne interactions between Petri nets modules, they act as channel
places [24].
Step 2: for one conﬁguration of the µBroker, some Petri net modules are
selected to produce the complete model. Communications places (outlined in
black) represent links to other µBroker functions or to middleware services.
Step 3: the selected modules are merged to produce a global model. This
model and one initial marking enable the veriﬁcation of the middleware prop-
erties.
Functions can be separately veriﬁed and then combined to form the com-
plete Petri net model. Multiple models can be assembled from a common
library of models. Thus, we can test for speciﬁc conditions (policies and set-
tings).
The initial marking of the Petri Net deﬁnes available resources (e.g. threads,
I/O); or sets up internal counters. Its state space covers all possible interleav-
ing of atomic actions: we test all possible execution orders.
We have detailed the steps from middleware requirements for DRE sys-
tems, down to the modeling of one conﬁguration using Petri nets. This allows
us to verify speciﬁc middleware behavioral properties on our models.
5 Verifying properties of the µBroker
In this section, we introduce some of the expected properties the µBroker as
well as the formal techniques used to verify them by model-checking.
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5.1 µBroker conﬁgurations and models
In this section, we review the key parameters that characterize the µBroker,
and some of the properties one might expect from such a component.
The µBroker is deﬁned by the set of policies and the resources it uses.
These settings are common to a large set of applications. We consider one
middleware instance, in server mode, that processes all incoming requests.
We study two conﬁgurations of the µBroker: Mono-Tasking (one main envi-
ronment task) and Multi-Tasking (multiple tasks, using the Leader/Followers
policy described in [18]). The latter allows parallel request processing.
We assume that middleware resources are pre-allocated: we consider a
static pool of threads; a bounded number of I/O sources and one preallocated
memory pool to store requests. This hypothesis is acceptable: it corresponds
to typical engineering practices in the context of critical systems. Our imple-
mentations and the corresponding models are controlled by three parameters:
• Smax is the upper bound of I/O Sources listening for incoming data;
• Tmax is the number of Threads available within the middleware;
• Bsize is the size of the Buﬀer allocated to read data from I/O sources.
Smax and Tmax deﬁne a workload proﬁle for the middleware node, Bsize de-
ﬁnes constraints on the memory allocated by the µBroker to process requests.
These parameters control middleware throughput and execution correctness.
We list four essential properties of our component. They represent key
properties our component must verify to fulﬁll its role.
• P0 (symmetry): threads and I/O are unordered, elements in a class are
equivalent;
• P1 (no deadlock): the system may always process incoming requests;
• P2 (consistency): there is no buﬀer overﬂow;
• P3 (fairness): every event on a source is detected and processed.
P0, P1, P3 are diﬃcult to verify only through the execution of some test
cases: one has to examine all possible execution orders. This may not be
aﬀordable or even possible due to the many possible threads and requests
interleaving. Besides, the adequate dimensioning of static resources to ensure
consistency (P2) is a strong requirement for DRE systems, yet it is a hard
problem for open systems such as middleware. Thus, we propose to verify
them by model-checking.
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5.2 Analysis methods
The system we model is complex and uses diﬀerent resources, its state-space
is expected to be huge. We detail the ﬁgures in section 6.1: the system has
a state-space of up to 1011 states for the values we considered and is thus
impossible to treat with classic methods. We therefore decided to reduce
the problem by performing a symmetry analysis of the model, and using the
results to generate a compact representation of the state-space of the system,
suitable for model-checking. This symmetry analysis is fully automated, and
is performed for each given conﬁguration of the middleware we considered. We
also take into account the property to be checked, allowing further reductions
by abstracting away behaviors that are not observed by the property, using
dynamically adapted on-the-ﬂy algorithms. This section superﬁcially explains
how the tools work (complete descriptions of the algorithms can be found in
[25,2]). Moreover, these techniques may be used through a simple interface,
that requires no knowledge of these internals.
5.2.1 P0: Analyzing the symmetries of the model
We wish to prove property P0 (symmetry) ; the ﬁrst step is a symmetry
analysis that explores the model’s structure to determine which data types
present a homogeneous behavior. Two elements e1 and e2 of a given data type
are symmetric if exchanging e1 with e2 at any point in the execution of the
system does not modify its behavior. By behavior, we mean that from an
observer’s point of view, the system appears to be the same.
For this analysis, we ﬁrst consider the LTL point of view of an action-based
observer that sees all events happening as a sequence. To this slightly myopic
observer, the actual values used to trigger the events are blurred, only the
sequences of occurrences of actions are visible. Such a sequence is called an ω-
word, the alphabet of which is an occurrence of an action. The set of ω-words
that the system can generate using the alphabet of event occurrences is called
the language of the actions of the system. Due to interlacement semantics,
this language may be exponentially smaller than the language of the system
over an alphabet that sees operation arguments. It can be represented by
a quotient state-space graph, thus exponentially smaller than the concrete
state-space graph.
To analyze the symmetries of a system, our algorithm [25] examines each
action (transition) of the system to ﬁnd which elements (if any) it distin-
guishes, and concludes that any element distinguished by at least one action
should be distinguished in R. The result of this symmetry analysis is an
equivalence relation R that lists for each data type the symmetric values with
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respect to the language of the actions of the system. This automatic com-
putation ensures that any elements considered equivalent under R are not
distinguished by any action of the system. R deﬁnes a set allowable permuta-
tions or rotations [5] that can be applied to the objects of the system without
aﬀecting the transition relation.
We then translate high-level annotations to symbolically expressed ones
that use R in a simple and readily analyzable form, the rigorous syntax of
Well-Formed nets [5]. Finally we construct a quotient reachability graph under
R, using the GreatSPN [7] kernel, in which nodes represent an equivalence
class of states under R. Let us mention that computation of symmetries is
very fast since it is a structural property of the Petri net. Its complexity is
thus related to the size of the speciﬁcation (number of places and transitions),
but not to the state space size.
Symmetry analysis of the µBroker is computed on the structure of our
models. It yields an equivalence relation R that states that all Threads (resp.
Sources) are equivalent. Therefore, we prove that P0 (symmetry) is true. Note
that this property was not true on the ﬁrst versions of the model, and that
to obtain it we had to adapt some modeling choices of the components of the
µBroker.
5.2.2 P1, P2: Verifying symmetric properties
The property P1 states that there exists no deadlock; this is a property that
our action-based LTL observer can see. We therefore can verify this property
on the quotient produced under the relation R. The quotient graph lists at
most Smax!·Tmax! permutations for each state in a compact manner, it is thus
exponentially smaller than the concrete state-space, allowing faster veriﬁcation
of the property.
To verify P2 (consistency), we check that accesses to memory pools are
correct. The places (DataSlotsi)i∈1..M represent the memory pool. Write
operations insert a token in one place from this set, read operations withdraw
one. Data inconsistency occurs when writing more than once in a slot. It is
tested by a safety property expressed by an LTL formula (1), that asserts that
such a state is unreachable.
∀d ∈ DataSlots,G(card(d) ≤ 1) (1)
The interesting point is that this property is directly observable on the
graph produced under R, as permutations of elements will not change the
cardinality of the place that is tested in P1. Therefore if we consider a node
of the quotient state-space, as all its elements are equivalent under R, we
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can assert whether or not it veriﬁes card(d) ≤ 1 directly. An analysis of
the symmetries of the property proves and uses this property automatically,
without user’s intervention.
Thus, we verify there is no data corruption for Smax≤ Bsize, by model
checking for diﬀerent values of Smaxand Bsize, but we notice that data-corruption
occurs otherwise. We interpret this result by the fact that model semantics
does not allow more than card(DataSlots) successive write operations, and
thus does not overﬂow the buﬀer.
5.2.3 P3: Exploiting observed behavioral symmetries
We have seen the equivalence relation of the system R, although permissive,
can allow veriﬁcation of symmetric properties. However, to verify P3 (fair-
ness), we need to evaluate the LTL formula:
⎧⎨
⎩
∀s ∈ Sources, a = {s} ⊆ ModifiedSrc, b = {s} ⊆ DataOnSrc,
G(a ⇒ F b)
(2)
It states that any event on a given source s will eventually be handled. If so,
the token representing s should move from the notiﬁcation place ModifiedSrc
(“the µBroker detected a pending request”) to initial place DataOnSrc (“new
incoming request”). This property cannot be observed reliably by our action-
based LTL observer, as it requires that the binding of s in the action “the
µBroker detected a pending request from s” be remembered, so that we can
verify that the same s is eventually seen moving to DataOnSrc. However,
thanks to symmetry, if ∃s ∈ Sources such that P3 holds true, as we know
all sources to be equivalent, we will have proved the property ∀s ∈ Sources.
This avoids redundant veriﬁcation for each source, although this would also
be possible as the number of sources is supposed ﬁnite.
We therefore choose a source s that we individualize, by constructing a
quotient graph under more restrictive relation R ′ such that s cannot be per-
muted with other sources. Thus our observer can now see events relating to s
as diﬀerent from events relating to other sources. However, the cost of distin-
guishing even a single source is up to a factorial increase (card(Sources)!) in
the state-space size. Thus even if the system is structurally symmetric, when
the formula is not –as in this case– its evaluation generates again (though with
a delay) the state-space explosion problem.
Thus, the quotient reachability graph suﬀers from a major limitation: it
does not tackle partially symmetric systems or partially symmetric properties.
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However recent advances have shown that these partial symmetries can be
exploited in LTL veriﬁcation, through the Symbolic Synchronized Product
(SSP) method [2]. The basic intuition is to use an observer capable of zooming
in (i.e. by using a reﬁned R ′) whenever there is a potential problem, and
zooming out (i.e. by allowing more permutations in R ′) when a “blurred”
vision is enough to verify the property.
For instance, the property may distinguish objects only in parts of an
execution run, e.g. P3. Sources can be permuted when there are no re-
quests pending. We need to distinguish the source s only when the place
ModifiedSrc contains a request from a source s. This partial temporal asym-
metry can be captured by working with the Büchi automaton that represents
the LTL property [27]. To perform model-checking, we compute the intersec-
tion of the language recognized by the negation of a property with the language
of the system. This operation is computed by the synchronized product of the
state-space and the automata of the formula. It is thus usually of complexity
polynomial over the product of the sizes of the automaton of the LTL formula,
and of the state-space itself. However, we construct our symmetry-aware Sym-
bolic Synchronized Product on the ﬂy, and we adapt the relationR ′ (our zoom
setting) under which we build the successors of a state, to the arc of the LTL
automaton with which it is being synchronized.
Consider the automata corresponding to the
q0
true

a∧¬b 
 	
q1
¬b

Fig. 4: Automata of the
negation of property P3
negation of P3 represented ﬁgure 4. An ω-word
(or sequence of events) recognized by this automa-
ton is composed of a ﬁnite sequence of events (we
don’t care which, synchronizing with the arc true),
followed by an event such that a ∧ ¬b becomes
true after the event, and then ¬b always remain
true (accepting state q1). Such a sequence contradicts P3, thus producing a
counter-example. In the SSP construction, while synchronizing with the arc
"true", no asymmetry is introduced thus all model objects are equivalent, we
can zoom out; but a synchronization with the arc " a ∧ ¬b" forces to individ-
ualize the source "s" (zoom in) to allow a correct symbolic veriﬁcation.
In the current case, as P3 holds true, the sequences of the synchronized
product that match “a∧¬b” but not “¬b always true” are eventually garbage
collected. The ﬁnal size of the SSP proving the validity of P3 is therefore no
more than the size of the quotient graph under R allowing all permutations,
as all actions in the SSP end up synchronizing with the arc true.
The SSP is a powerful technique, also able to tackle partially symmetric
systems, in which objects behave asymmetrically only in localized parts of the
model. Usually, as the action-based symmetry analysis is global, these local
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asymmetries will yield a restrictive relation R, and the graph built under R
may be as large as the concrete state-space. A typically encountered case is
distributed systems that present an initialization phase in which privileged ini-
tiators play a diﬀerent role, but then all participants behave like symmetrical
peers once the system is running. SSP addresses this problem (by zooming in
just when running the initialization), but as the µBroker is (by design) fully
symmetric, this particular reduction was not used for our veriﬁcation. We
plan to use this capability in further works, for more advanced and complex
conﬁgurations.
6 Veriﬁcation results and performances
In this section, we detail ﬁgures and performance of the veriﬁcation of the
µBroker.
6.1 Modeling and analysing the µBroker
The Mono-Tasking model has 47 places, 38 transitions and 134 arcs. Multi-
Tasking model is twice as large. Number of tasks and I/Os has no eﬀect on
the size of the model (it is coded as types for Petri net tokens), the size of the
buﬀer has an impact on the number of places and transitions.
Figure 5 summarizes the size of the state space for Bsize= 5 and Smax= 4.
Petri Net models have an average size, yet the state space is large, it denotes
the complexity of the system. Its size increases exponentially with Tmax and
Smax. We also note that the symbolic reachability graph is smaller by several
powers of ten, and that this ration increases with Tmax. Thus, computations
can be completed within acceptable delays on usual workstations, in less than
10 hours for the biggest models, on 2.6GHz Pentium-4 computers with 512MB
of memory running GNU/Linux.
From these diﬀerent ﬁgures, we claim that the analysis of PolyORB could
not have been performed without the use of these advanced model checking
techniques because of intrinsic memory limitations of typical workstations.
This is depicted in ﬁgure 5. It clearly shows an exponential ratio between the
concrete state space and the quotient reachability graph. As an illustration,
even for common middleware conﬁgurations (7 threads and 4 I/O sources)
the system presents about 1011 states, but we could compute and evaluate its
properties on a quotient reachability graph on a computer having 512MB of
memory without swapping. We also observe that the quotient graph evolution
decreases. As an example, from 4 to 5 threads, the quotient graph increases
by a factor of 80% and from 5 to 6, by a factor of 57%. At a given stage, it
should reach an asymptote (e.g. when adding new threads does not impact
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on the system symbolic complexity at all). This is of particular interest since
the state space evolution remains exponential.
The SSP technique brings further reductions as illustrated by ﬁgure 6,
that compares it to the global symmetry approach. It shows how the gain
from the reduction increases as the parameters increase. It is equivalent to
the global symmetry approach for one source (no symmetry to exploit), then
oﬀers a polynomial size reduction over Smax. No value is provided when Smax
reaches 5: Bsize is 4 and the property is not veriﬁed as we have shown in the
previous section, thus the the on-the-ﬂy counter-example production algorithm
interrupts state-space examination.
We veriﬁed two conﬁgurations: we tested LTL formulae representing ex-
pected properties, we extracted scenarios that help dimensioning resources.
Our model-checking tools overcome the complexity of the µBroker model. The
veriﬁed properties provide strong evidence that our architecture is correct.
6.2 Assessment of our veriﬁcation tools
The tools we used have a signiﬁcant role to achieve veriﬁcation. Our models
were created using CPN-AMI [15], a Petri net CASE environment that in-
tegrates structural analysis tools and model checkers. We then analyse data
type symmetries [25] and compute the reduced state space using the Great-
SPN [7] tool-suite and extensions for SSP. Finally for LTL model-checking, we
used the model checking library Spot [16], in conjunction with GreatSPN. All
these tools have drivers available that make them plug-ins, homogeneously ac-
cessible from CPN-AMI, and hiding the complexity of their interactions from
J. Hugues et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 133 (2005) 139–157 153
the end-user. CPN-AMI and SPOT are developed in LIP6/SRC. GreatSPN
is developed at the Dipartimento di Informatica at the University of Torino.
The LTL capabilities of GreatSPN and SSP computation are the result of a
cooperation between Paris and Torino.
An important aspect of the veriﬁcation process is that both the global
structural analysis of the system and the partial symmetry analysis used in
SSP were computed wholly automatically, thanks to our recently introduced
extensions to the GreatSPN kernel [25,2]. As we tested our properties over
a wide range of conﬁgurations and parameter values, symmetry analysis "by
hand" would have been unfeasible, and less reliable as it would have required
human intervention.
Our symmetry-aware algorithms help us to address the state-space explo-
sion. The reduced state-space is smaller than the ones produced by typical
algorithms by a power of ten. This diﬀerence increases with the parameters
Smax, Tmax, Bsize. This demonstrates that our tools make it possible to verify
complex systems. The use of formal veriﬁcation techniques on the µBroker
allowed to correct some bugs, and gives us a much higher level of conﬁdence
in the architecture of PolyORB.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we focused on middleware architectures and the veriﬁcation
of their behavioral properties. We outlined current trends in middleware en-
gineering: multiple architectures exist to support the requirements of DRE
systems; yet, veriﬁcation is seldom contemplated. Indeed, verifying a dis-
tributed infrastructure is a complex task as long as middleware development
does not integrate very early in the design process both distribution functions
and veriﬁcation requirements.
We aim at providing a proof-based middleware. We present the Schizophrenic
Middleware Architecture, and detailed steps to verify it. We chose Petri nets
as a modeling language, and LTL to express and then verify its properties.
The schizophrenic architecture emphasizes on the separation of concerns
in middleware: a set of fundamental services covers middleware functional
components, a Middleware Main Loop coordinates them. Services can be
adapted to support conﬁgurability and genericity requirements. thus, our
schizophrenic middleware PolyORB is a good candidate to build proof-based
middleware.
We identiﬁed the key component that controls the whole middleware be-
havior and reﬁned it to deﬁne the µBroker pattern. This adaptable component
proposes a complete deﬁnition of a middleware main control loop.
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We detailed the steps to model and then verify it using Petri nets, a com-
plete theoretical framework to assess properties of control systems such as the
µBroker. Then, we discussed the veriﬁcation of several conﬁgurations of the
µBroker.
We introduced tools and algorithms to achieve veriﬁcation. The state-space
explosion is a typical problems when modeling system with Petri nets. We
present advanced techniques used to overcome this problem. These techniques
allows the testing of LTL formulas on reduced state space: the quotient state
space. It fully exploits global and local symmetries of the model. Hence, we
could assessed our model is fair for incoming requests, without deadlock; we
detailed how we can check that resources are correctly dimensioned. We note
that the ratio between the quotient graph and the complete state space is
exponential; the state space evolution remains exponential since the quotient
graph tends to an asymptote. This analysis could have never been performed
using classical model checking techniques.
Thus, we achieved the complete veriﬁcation of key middleware behavioral
properties. this is a ﬁrst step towards the construction of a proof-based mid-
dleware. To reach this goal, we had to improve the schizophrenic architecture
in order to address both distribution functions and behavioral veriﬁcation re-
quirements.
Besides, this analysis of middleware properties provides a case study for
the use of formal methods to verify a complex system. We discussed the
application of advanced techniques to overcome combinatorial explosions, and
how to use at best system information to optimize the veriﬁcation process.
Later work will consider two main directions. The ﬁrst one is to apply
veriﬁcation to more complex conﬁgurations (more tasks, more complex poli-
cies); but complete applications involving client and server nodes. The second
direction is to increase the link between models and implementations of the
µBroker. We will investigate ways to deduce code patterns from our veri-
ﬁed formal speciﬁcations to directly produce source code for one middleware
conﬁguration. This will increase conﬁdence in middleware as a COTS to be
integrated in critical applications.
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